Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression by Ferencz, Benjamin B.
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 6 
Issue 3 Symposium—Judgment at Nuremberg 
January 2007 
Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression 
Benjamin B. Ferencz 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 551 (2007), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
551 
ENABLING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT TO PUNISH AGGRESSION 
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ∗ 
According to Article Five of the Rome Statute, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression until amendments are adopted: (1) defining the crime; and (2) 
setting out the conditions, consistent with the United Nations (U.N.) 
Charter, under which the ICC is to act.1 This Essay analyzes the problems 
posed by these stipulated requirements, and suggests solutions to fulfill 
them.  
I. DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
A. Brief Historical Review 
1. The Nuremberg Precedents  
On August 8, 1945, after intensive negotiations, the victorious powers 
of World War II, “acting in the interests of all the United Nations,”2 drew 
up a constitution for an International Military Tribunal (IMT) “for the just 
and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals of the European 
Axis.”3 The IMT Charter was endorsed by twenty-one nations with 
diverse systems of jurisprudence. The first offense within the Court’s 
jurisdiction was described as:  
Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of wars of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.4  
Justice Robert H. Jackson, on leave from the U.S. Supreme Court and 
designated by President Harry Truman to be Chief Prosecutor for the 
United States, was the principle architect of the trial. Influenced by the 
 
 
 ∗ J.D. (1943), Harvard Law School; Former prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials; 
Contact information: Benferen@aol.com. For additional sources, see www.benferencz.org. 
 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2. Charter of the International Military Tribunal pmbl., Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. 
 3. Id. art. 1. 
 4. Id. art. 6. 
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historical record and existing treaties such as the 1928 Kellogg Pact 
(outlawing the use of force), Jackson became convinced that “[n]o 
political, military or other considerations” excuse going to war.5 
According to Jackson, “[w]hatever grievances a nation may have, . . . 
warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances.”6 After debating 
several drafts, Jackson concluded that, rather than listing the several 
treaties prohibiting the use of force, it would be more expedient to leave it 
to judges to consult their sources. Professor Andre Gros, who represented 
France at the trial, noted that “there are plenty of documents in actual 
international law defining aggression.”7 The British, eager to avoid 
political debate, were hesitant. The Soviets argued that the side that fired 
the first shot should obviously be considered the aggressor and should be 
punished accordingly. The final text was the best compromise possible.  
In his opening statement to the IMT, Jackson emphasized: “We must 
never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is 
the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these 
defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.”8 In its 
final and comprehensive Judgment of October 1946, the Nuremburg 
Tribunal held that to initiate a war of aggression “is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime . . . . It contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”9 Rejecting the defense’s 
argument that it was applying ex post facto law, the Tribunal held that the 
IMT Charter was not an arbitrary exercise of power by victorious nations, 
but “the expression of international law existing at the time of its 
creation.”10 There was nothing unfair about not having a more precise 
definition of the crime of aggression; to allow the accused to remain 
immune would have been unfair. “Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
 
 
 5. Robert Jackson, Opening Statement for the Prosecution at Nuremburg (Nov. 21, 1945), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm [hereinafter Jackson Opening 
Statement]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, Int’l Conference on Military Trials, 
http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/Avalon/lmt/Jackson/jack37. 
 8. Jackson Opening Statement, supra note 5. 
 9. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals: The Nazi Regime in Germany, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/ 
judnazi.htm#common. 
 10. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals: The Law of the Charter, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/ 
judlawch.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). 
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law be enforced.”11 Leading German officials were found guilty of 
planning and waging aggressive war against ten nations. Five of the 
twenty-two defendants were sentenced to death. Jackson reported to his 
President: “[A]t long last the law is now unequivocal in classifying armed 
aggression as an international crime instead of a national right.”12  
The legal principles of the IMT Charter and Judgment—including the 
brief definition of aggression—became the foundation for later trials by 
the Allied Powers in Japan and other countries. The quadripartite Control 
Council Laws authorized several “subsequent proceedings.” These 
proceedings borrowed the IMT definition of Crimes against Peace, but 
inserted one additional illustration: “Initiation of invasions of other 
countries.”13 The 1946 Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East 
adopted the exact wording of the IMT Charter regarding aggression, 
adding only a clarifying clause explaining that a war of aggression could 
be “declared or undeclared.”14 The Tokyo Judgment of November 1948, 
which found the defendants guilty of the crime of aggressive war, 
conformed completely with the definitions laid down at Nuremberg. 
Nations were beginning to live up to Jackson’s hope that a firmer 
enforcement of the laws of international conduct would “make war less 
attractive to those who have governments and the destiny of peoples in 
their power.”15  
2. The U.N. Searches for a Consensus Definition of Aggression  
At its first session, held on December 11, 1946, the General Assembly 
of the United Nations established Committees for the Progressive 
Development of International Law and its Codification, as required by the 
U.N. Charter. It also affirmed the principles of international law 
recognized by the IMT Charter and Judgment. As “a matter of primary 
 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INT’L CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY TRIALS: LONDON, 1945, reprinted in CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE PUBLICATION 3080 (Government Printing Office) (1949), available at http://www.yale.edu/ 
lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jackson.htm. 
 13. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity art. 2, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 
50–55 (1946). 
 14. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(a), Jan. 19, 1946, 
amended Apr. 26, 1946, TIAS No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. 
 15. ROBERT JACKSON, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ATROCITIES AND WAR CRIMES, JUNE 7, 
1945, reprinted in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN (Government Printing Office) 
(1945), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jack01.htm. 
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importance,”16 the General Assembly called for the formulation of a 
general Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, or of 
an International Criminal Code, based on the precedent of Nuremberg. In 
addition, genocide, on any grounds, was affirmed as a crime under 
international law for which both principals and accomplices would be 
punishable.  
After considerable discussion by U.N. Delegates (but little progress), 
the dual problems of drafting the Criminal Code and creating the related 
Criminal Court were referred to an International Law Commission (ILC) 
composed of legal experts from different parts of the world. In 1950, the 
ILC formulated the Nuremberg Principles while noting the absence of a 
precise definition for a “war of aggression.” In 1952, a Special Committee 
on the Question of Defining Aggression was formed by the General 
Assembly. Until there was a definition, the Criminal Code would be 
incomplete, and without a Code, the Court could not function. Definition, 
Code, and Court were made dependent upon each other. The problems 
were interconnected, but opinions on how to resolve them remained 
sharply divided. By the end of 1954, the onset of the Cold War had put 
these problems on hold.  
New Committees reported annually to the growing number of U.N. 
Member States. Extended debates were continued in the Assembly’s Sixth 
(Legal) Committee. In 1967, the Special Committee was expanded to 
thirty-five members, representing every legal system. Most nations agreed 
that an International Criminal Court was highly desirable, but many also 
doubted that it was attainable. Some powerful countries did not want to 
yield any portion of their sovereignty to a new, untested institution. 
Nations were so busy committing or contemplating aggression that they 
had no time or desire to define the crime. The high moral and legal 
principles of Nuremberg were ignored, and aggression continued to be 
committed with impunity by nations large and small. The result was the 
continuation of indecisive discussions and the postponement problems that 
could not be resolved. The world lacked an international criminal court 
competent enough to hold any state to account for the supreme 
international crime. War-making, instead of being condemned as criminal, 
continued to be glorified as heroic, and the cost in human lives was 
incalculable.  
 
 
 16. History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 260 (H.M. Stationery Office, London 
1948). 
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The original General Assembly Resolutions of 1946, inspired by 
Nuremberg, envisaged the creation of a code of international offenses, 
including the supreme crime of aggression, to be enforced by a new 
International Criminal Tribunal. After over a quarter of a century of 
contentious debate by lawyers, scholars and diplomats, the U.N. Special 
Committee to Define Aggression finally arrived at a consensus definition 
that was accepted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1974, as 
G.A. Resolution 3314. The compromise left much to be desired. The 
preamble called upon states to refrain from all acts of aggression. It then 
recommended, as though by afterthought, that the Security Council (S.C.) 
should “as appropriate take account of that Definition as guidance.”17 The 
Preamble made no reference to an international criminal court. Nor did it 
address the question of criteria for individual culpability. Delegates 
seemed to have forgotten, or chosen to ignore, the General Assembly 
mandates of 1946.  
Article One of G.A. Resolution 3314 set forth a generic definition:  
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as set out in this Definition.18  
The following seven articles contain illustrations of acts of aggression, 
which “regardless of a declaration of war,”19 include such traditionally 
war-like acts as invasion, annexation, bombardment, blockade, and attack. 
Article Two requires acts to be “of sufficient gravity,” but it also allows 
the S.C. “in conformity with the Charter,” to determine that there was no 
aggression “in light of other relevant circumstances.”20 However, the 
enumerated acts are not exhaustive, and the Council may also determine 
that “other acts constitute aggression.”21 In short, it was left to the S.C. to 
decide whether aggression by a state has occurred or not. Repeated 
reference to the U.N. Charter was intended to make the pill more 
palatable.  
Article Five, reminiscent of Jackson, provides that: “[N]o consideration 
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, 
 
 
 17. G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 18. Id. art. 1. 
 19. Id. art. 3. 
 20. Id. art. 2. 
 21. Id. art. 4. 
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may serve as justification for aggression.”22 Article Seven was an 
exculpatory paragraph designed to exempt from a charge of aggression 
peoples struggling for “self-determination,” and freedom from “alien 
domination . . . .”23  
The U.N. Charter itself was ambiguous. Its Article Two sought to 
restrain the use of force, while Article Fifty-one allowed an undefined but 
“inherent right” to self-defense against an armed attack.24 Little noted was 
the caveat that when war-making ceased to be an inherent right, 
unrestrained self-defense also ceased to be an inherent right. The 
contradictions and vagaries entwined throughout the Charter, and the 
consensus definition of aggression, opened the door to conflicting 
interpretations. No court existed that was competent to enlighten nations 
and hold wrongdoers to account. The permanent members of the S.C., 
particularly the U.S. and the United Kingdom, would not have accepted 
any definition of aggression without retaining the last word in determining 
when aggression had occurred. Powerful nations remained unwilling to 
yield their power, and weak nations lacked the power to object.  
No legal code can be effective unless the society in which it operates is 
prepared to be bound by common restraints. With nations in different 
stages of social, political and economic evolution, it has proved impossible 
to obtain clear agreements defining the legal limits of permissible force. 
The resulting consensus gave some indication of what conduct should be 
prohibited; the product was merely a guide recommended for 
consideration by the Council. This weak consensus became acceptable 
only after the insertion of exculpatory clauses that parties could interpret 
so as to justify their own illegal use of armed force. The wording left no 
doubt that the 1974 consensus definition of aggression bound no one. It 
reflected the fears, doubts, and hesitations of its time. However, it was also 
a cautious step toward a more rational world order.  
3. The International Law Commission Defines Aggression  
The wheels of justice grind slowly, but the law gradually changes to 
meet the needs of an evolving world. When it became apparent in the 
1990s that an international criminal court would become a reality, the 
General Assembly increased its pressure on the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to produce a definition of individual culpability for 
 
 
 22. Id. art. 5. 
 23. Id. art. 7. 
 24. U.N. Charter arts. 2, paras. 4, 51. 
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aggression that would meet the standards of criminal law. Decision makers 
had to give fair notice that those responsible for the illegal use of massive 
force would no longer be immune from prosecution. The ILC had, for 
years, been deliberating on general statutes for an international criminal 
court as well as a separate code for specific international crimes. In 
September of 1994, the ILC completed a draft statute for the ICC. That 
draft became the subject of intense debate within the various U.N. 
Preparatory Committees. In July of 1996, after more than fifteen years of 
discussion, the ILC completed its work on the Draft Code of Crimes. 
Article Sixteen, dealing with the “crime of aggression” stated: “An 
individual, who as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a 
State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.”25 
The ILC Commentary made plain that, fifty years after Nuremberg, it 
would be retrogressive to not include aggression among the other crimes 
over which the ICC had jurisdiction. The ILC’s brief definition of 
aggression is consistent with the U.N. Charter and Judgment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. Only an individual who plays a decisive role as 
leader or organizer would be found culpable, and only then if he actively 
participates in the planning and preparation of aggression. States can act 
only through individuals. The Commission Report provided that a 
violation of the law by a state “is a sine qua non condition for the possible 
attribution to an individual of responsibility for a crime of aggression.”26 
Thus, a successful prosecution would require both proof that a state had 
committed an act of aggression and proof that the individual defendant 
met the stated requirements for personal criminal responsibility.  
4. What Happened to the Definition of Aggression at the 1998 Rome 
Conference  
The ILC drafts became the basis for intense negotiations. By the time 
the Prepatory Commissions met in Rome in the summer of 1998, there 
were still many points of difference to be reconciled regarding the 
structure and authority of the ICC. The crime of aggression was probably 
the most difficult point of contention. Many states argued that aggression 
 
 
 25. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 16, U.N. GAOR, 48th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr. 1, corr. 2 (1996). 
 26. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its Forty-Eighth Session, G.A. Res. 51/60, at pt. II-D, art. 16, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/51/10. 
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should not be included in the ICC’s jurisdiction. The U.S. and U.K. were 
among those that were hesitant about accepting new legal restraints that 
would hamper their freedom of military or humanitarian intervention. 
Arab States seemed eager to retain the perceived protection of the 
exculpatory clauses in the 1974 consensus definition. Many others, 
including the European Union and about thirty “nonaligned” countries, 
argued that without jurisdiction over aggression, the ICC would be 
unacceptable. There was a stalemate.  
After five weeks of hectic effort at the Diplomatic Conference in 
Rome, the U.N. announced on July 17, 1998, for the first time in human 
history, the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court. The 
announcement was a bit of an exaggeration since the treaty still needed to 
be ratified by at least sixty nations before it could go into effect. Article 
Five listed the crime of aggression, along with genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, as the only crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. In addition, it was stipulated that the Court could not exercise 
its jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression until certain new 
provisions were adopted. Agreement on a definition of aggression was 
needed, as well as the settlement of the conditions under which the ICC 
could operate.27 These required additions also needed to be “consistent 
with the relevant provisions” of the U.N. Charter.28 Any amendments to 
the Rome Statute required approval by seven-eighths of the parties, and no 
amendments could be considered for at least seven years after the statute 
went into effect. Lacking the ability and time to resolve its differences, the 
parties placed the problem of defining aggression on the back burner.  
5. The Assembly of State Parties Considers the Crime of Aggression  
Having received more than the required number of ratifications, the 
Rome Statute went into effect on July 1, 2002. It was an historic occasion. 
The first Assembly of State Parties (ASP) appointed new Preparatory 
Commissions to continue debate about the unresolved problems regarding 
aggression, but few agreements were reached. The ASP also established a 
Working Group to seek reconciliation of conflicting views. Although not 
specifically required by the wording of Article Five, meetings were held at 
Princeton and the Hague to consider improvements on principles of law 
that still seemed ambiguous. It should have come as no surprise that 
lengthy discussions produced few agreed-upon alterations. Despite the 
 
 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2). 
 28. Id. 
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merits of several carefully prepared scholarly submissions, the prospects 
of getting near-unanimous concurrence was not particularly promising. It 
seemed to be overlooked that the test was not whether a suggested change 
would improve the statute, but whether it would be overwhelmingly 
accepted at an amendment conference.  
B. A Compromise Proposal: A Comprehensive Definition  
In response to the first mandate of Article 5, the following text was 
suggested for consideration by the ASP:  
Because the forms of aggression may be so variable and 
unpredictable that it has not been possible to reach universal 
agreement on a more precise definition of the crime, it is proposed 
that the following amendment be adopted: In determining whether 
an individual has committed the crime of aggression, the ICC 
judges shall apply the following: 
1) Relevant provisions of the UN Charter; 
2) The Charter and Judgment of the International Military Tribunals 
as affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1946; 
3) The consensus definition of aggression in G.A. Resolution 3314 
of 1974; 
4) The definition of aggression by the International Law 
Commission in 1996; 
5) Rules for interpreting international law as laid down for the 
International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the 
United Nations;  
6) Relevant judicial decisions by other competent international 
criminal tribunals;  
7) National laws and decisions relating to the crime of aggression.29 
The proposal relied on declarations and precedents drawn verbatim 
from documents and legal principles that were already generally accepted. 
Many experts argue that the crime of aggression has already been 
recognized as an international common law crime. Therefore, it is not 
 
 
 29. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the Int’l Criminal Court to Punish Agrression, http://www. 
benferencz.org/arts/90.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
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necessary to try to invent a new statutory definition beyond what is 
prescribed in the official instruments listed above.  
The consolidated definition conforms to principles of legality and 
fairness by putting potential aggressors on notice that they tread a very 
perilous path. Since deterrence is the primary goal of criminal law, an all-
inclusive definition should not be objectionable to those who are prepared 
to be bound by the rule of law. Of course, as is the case in every great 
historical document, as more amendments are proposed, it will be more 
difficult to gain universal acceptance for alterations. Competent judges 
must be relied upon to reach wise decisions or suggest legislative changes 
should they appear necessary in the future. In the interim, unless the ICC 
is given authority to act on the crime of aggression, malevolent or 
misguided leaders may continue to commit aggression with impunity.  
II. CONDITIONS FOR ICC JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
As noted previously, Article Five of the Rome Statute stipulates that 
before aggression can be prosecuted by the ICC, an amendment must be 
adopted “setting out the conditions under which the court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”30 Furthermore, “[s]uch a provision 
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”31  
A. Provisions of the U.N. Charter Relevant to Aggression  
As originally conceptualized, the United Nations system of collective 
security was to be relatively simple. Peace-loving nations would agree 
upon certain fundamental principles for a more humane and just 
international society. Nations would disarm and an international military 
force would be created for their protection. A few of the most powerful 
states, acting as agents for the others, would be entrusted with 
enforcement. The U.N. Charter made no reference to criminal 
prosecutions. Justice Robert Jackson and allied jurists were then 
negotiating in London for the IMT Charter. The trial against major war 
criminals began three months later and judgment was rendered in October 
1946. When the first General Assembly of the U.N. met in New York at 
the end of December 1946, it affirmed the Nuremberg principles and 
 
 
 30. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2). 
 31. Id. 
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promptly began to move toward the creation of a permanent international 
criminal jurisdiction to close the gap in the international legal order.  
To gain widespread acceptance, the U.N. Charter included 
compromises and inconsistent principles expressed in language subject to 
various interpretations by nations with conflicting interests and 
perceptions. The Preamble, in the name of “We the People,” expressed a 
determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”32 
(The undefined term “war” appears nowhere else.) It also reaffirmed faith 
in “the equal rights . . . of nations large or small.”33 However, some 
nations were “more equal” than others. Those major powers that had won 
the war—the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., China and France—felt entitled to 
retain a right to veto any future enforcement action that might require their 
troops. Without such a privilege, the U.S. surely would not politically have 
been able to muster the two-thirds Senate majority needed to ratify the 
U.N. treaty. The Security Council, with its inequitable veto rights, was 
charged with the duty of determining “the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and of deciding on 
measures to restore international peace and security.34 The lofty Charter 
plan could only be effective if those who were allies in war could remain 
allies in peace. Unfortunately, it did not quite work out that way.  
The problem of agreeing on a Code of International Crimes, and a 
Court to it, was winding its way slowly through the United Nations when 
an unanticipated event brought about a sudden and dramatic 
transformation. In 1991, civil wars broke out in Yugoslavia, as rival ethnic 
groups sought sovereignty and independence. It was widely reported that 
mass rapes were occurring, and that captives were being treated under 
conditions reminiscent of Auschwitz and Dachau. It did not take the 
Security Council long to set up a special tribunal in 1993 to bring to 
justice those who committed the atrocities. Similarly, a temporary tribunal 
of limited jurisdiction was created by the Security Council in 1994 to cope 
with genocide in Rwanda, where some 800,000 innocent civilians were 
brutally murdered. Since these incidents were internal conflicts, the crime 
of aggression was not implicated, but the need for a permanent 
international criminal court became increasingly obvious.  
As the plans for the ICC began to take shape, it became clear that there 
were two separate, but linked, problems that had to be resolved before the 
crime of aggression could be punished. Because the act of aggression 
 
 
 32. U.N. Charter, supra note 24, pmbl. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. art. 39. 
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requires a high threshold of violence to concern the international 
community as a whole, such acts could only be committed by a state or 
similar entity. Yet, as noted at Nuremberg, crimes are committed by 
individuals, not abstract entities. Only after prohibited acts occurred could 
the individuals responsible for them be held accountable before a criminal 
court. The act of aggression by a state and the crime of aggression by an 
individual were mutually dependent, and the distinctions between the two 
were by no means clear.  
After studying the problem of aggression for years, the ILC finally 
concluded in 1996 that the determination that a state had committed an act 
of aggression was an absolute pre-requisite for any individual to be 
convicted of the crime of aggression. This meant that, so long as the 
Security Council had to decide whether an act of aggression had been 
committed by a state, the permanent members could effectively control 
whether any individual would stand trial for the crime. It was not clear 
how the ICC could maintain its desired judicial independence if it had to 
await a prior determination by another body.  
The U.N. Charter vested in the Security Council “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” and 
all members agreed to carry out the Council’s decisions.35 To be sure, the 
Council was not given a completely free hand. It was obliged to act “in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law” and “in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”36 
Unfortunately, due to ideological and other differences, some of these 
principles soon gave way to political considerations. The Council fell into 
disrepute—particularly among smaller states, which often felt like little 
fish in a big pond. This distrust led many states to seek ways to avoid 
Council control when it came to punishing aggressors.  
B. Assuring the Independence of the Criminal Court  
Though the Security Council had primary jurisdiction to determine 
whether an act of aggression by a state had occurred, that prerogative was 
not exclusive. The General Assembly also had a role to play. When North 
Korean troops, aided by China, invaded South Korea in 1950, the S.C. 
seemed paralyzed by the absence of the Soviet representative, who had 
walked out in protest. The U.S. declared that the attack was “an act of 
aggression.” A U.S. Army counter-attack was mobilized under the U.N. 
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flag. The Assembly passed a resolution finding that “China, by giving 
direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression 
in Korea . . . has itself engaged in aggression in Korea,”37 and authorized 
economic sanctions.  
Other examples illustrate that where a political will existed, there was a 
way to interpret the Charter to achieve a desired goal. For example, it 
became standard practice for the S.C. to treat abstention as a positive vote, 
even though the Charter specifically required an affirmative vote. 
Recently, new concepts like the “duty to protect” have provided the 
opportunity for moral arguments to justify humanitarian interventions 
requiring the use of force, even when no prior Security Council 
authorization is obtained. Given the flexibility of the Charter, it is argued 
that when the Council fails to act, the General Assembly can unite and 
take measures in the cause of peace. If the General Assembly is competent 
to authorize economic and military sanctions in response to acts of 
aggression by a state, why should it be impermissible for it to authorize a 
criminal trial against aggressors? It may not be advisable to stretch the 
Charter in that direction, because the General Assembly is not a judicial 
body, and may be even more politically oriented than the Security 
Council.  
A better proposition is that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
(known as The World Court) could, on request from the General 
Assembly, issue an Advisory Opinion that would serve as a legal 
determination that an aggressive act by a state has occurred. The ICJ has 
issued such opinions regarding the legality of a U.S. naval blockade of 
Nicaragua, the crime of genocide, and the legality of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, there is no reason why the ICJ could not render an objective opinion 
concerning the legality of an act of aggression by a state. In its 
deliberations, the ICJ would take into consideration whatever arguments 
are presented to justify the alleged aggression. If, on the basis of an ICJ 
Opinion, the ICC Prosecutor decides, and the panel of ICC judges agree, 
that those responsible for the act should be indicted, there would be no 
injustice to the accused because the defendants would still have the 
opportunity to present their exculpatory arguments and evidence to the 
ICC. And, of course, the ICC judges may acquit the accused if they are 
convinced that fairness and justice so requires.  
Referrals from the ICC to the General Assembly, the ICJ, or any other 
international agency, such as the European Court of Human Rights, add 
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costly and time-consuming procedure. Victims will argue that justice 
delayed is justice denied. The ICC is a self-contained entity governed by a 
treaty signed by over a hundred nations. It should not be made dependent 
upon organizations outside its control. In addition, there is no assurance 
that substitute agencies would be willing or able to accept such a 
burdensome assignment from the court.  
Efforts to bypass the Security Council reflect the frustration of small 
states that have been waiting for years for legal protection against 
aggression. They are now demanding an end to a system that allows 
aggressors to defy the rule of law. The Security Council’s vested role 
under the U.N. Charter presents an obstacle. However, badly needed 
Charter alterations are nowhere in sight. And misinterpreting or stretching 
the law is a dangerous practice. I believe there is a way to respect the 
Charter, as correctly interpreted by the International Law Commission, 
while bringing justice to those leaders responsible for the supreme 
international crime.  
C. Alternative Ways to Achieve Justice  
It should be noted that national courts will, under the Rome Statute 
principles of complementarity, always be given priority to try their own 
nationals for any crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. If a state is 
willing and able to provide a fair trial, the accused will never be judged by 
the ICC. However, the crime of aggression is such that nations are not 
likely to try their own national leaders unless there has been a change of 
government. The ILC has concluded that there can be no prosecution by 
the ICC for the crime of aggression until the Security Council determines 
that an act of aggression has taken place. Even if this were true, that does 
not mean that the ICC will be indefinitely paralyzed. There are two steps 
that could be taken to bring wrongdoers to timely justice.  
1. Public Reports by the ICC Prosecutor  
The ICC Prosecutor, subject to statutory pre-trial judicial controls, may 
investigate the crime of aggression and issue a report of his findings. If the 
evidence adduced is insufficient to support a finding of guilt, the accused 
should be released. If such a finding could be made, the report should be 
made public. If the issue was previously referred to the Security Council 
for a determination regarding the act of aggression by the state involved, 
and there has been no response, the release of this report will add 
additional pressure on the Council to act promptly. An attempt by the 
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Council to halt an ICC investigation for a renewable twelve month period, 
as the statute allows, must be related to the Council’s peace-keeping 
responsibilities.  
It should not be forgotten that the S.C. is also bound by U.N. Charter 
obligations to respect principles of justice and international law. The ICC 
would be justified in ignoring S.C. decisions that clearly violate these 
Charter mandates. Admittedly, the ICC, like the ICJ and other human 
rights courts, has no independent enforcement power. However, abuse of 
the Security Council’s Charter responsibilities for political reasons is 
bound to encounter public outrage. The “shame factor” may hasten its 
decision regarding the legality of the acts under consideration. In the final 
analysis, the rule of law can only be sustained by the fairness of ICC 
procedures and judicial pronouncements that earn the respect of victims 
and observers. A Security Council that shows contempt for the ICC will 
bring contempt upon itself.  
2. Prosecute for Other Crimes in Addition to the Crime of Aggression  
It has become customary in war crimes prosecutions for the indictment 
to contain a number of crimes based on the same facts. Nuremberg 
defendants were indicted and convicted of the common plan or conspiracy 
to commit crimes against peace (aggressive war), war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. It would be perfectly within the discretion of the ICC 
prosecutor to charge the accused with the crime of aggression, as well as 
with war crimes, crimes against humanity, or even genocide. The 
prosecutor would not need to remain immobilized while waiting for a 
Security Council determination that an act of aggression has taken place, 
nor for the opinion of any other body. The trial can proceed promptly on 
any or all of the other three related charges. These are all crimes within the 
ICC’s statutory jurisdiction, and none have pre-requisites that require 
Security Council intervention. The maximum penalty for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or aggression are all limited to a term of life 
imprisonment. There would be no affront to victims, or benefit to the 
accused, if the aggression charge remains pending while these other counts 
proceed to judgment.  
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINALIZING 
AGGRESSION  
The most important achievement of the Nuremberg trials was the 
confirmation that war-making is no longer a national right, but has instead 
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become an international crime. That great historical step forward in the 
law must be sustained.  
The distinguished jurists of the International Law Commission have 
agreed that the crime of aggression should be actionable by the ICC, even 
without a more detailed definition. Adopting a broad, consolidated 
definition of the crime of aggression to reflect norms that have already 
been universally accepted is a clear demonstration that illegal war-making 
will no longer be tolerated. It also gives fair notice to the accused.  
The use of armed force is only permissible when approved by the 
Security Council in accordance with the U.N. Charter. Even when Council 
responses seem inadequate, the Charter mandates must be respected. The 
Charter principle of justice under international law can still be effectuated 
by means other than waiting for S.C. confirmation regarding the act of 
aggression. The prosecutor can proceed to trial promptly on related war 
crimes charges.  
To be sure, punishing aggression will not, by itself, eliminate wars, but 
it is an important component of a vast matrix which encompasses social 
justice, disarmament, and a system of effective enforcement. If peace is to 
be protected, it is essential that all national leaders be aware that 
individuals responsible for the crime of aggression will be held criminally 
accountable before the bar of international justice—no matter how long it 
takes.  
Unauthorized war-making is neither legal nor inevitable. Humankind 
has glorified wars since time immemorial. Admittedly, it will take a very 
long time to reverse ingrained habits of thought and substitute a “peace 
ethic” for the prevailing “war ethic.” Unpredictable events often determine 
the course of history. Many great military leaders have come to recognize 
that nations can no longer rely on the use of force but must turn to the rule 
of law if they are to survive. New forms of violence and terror pose 
increasing threats that emphasize the need for new thinking. As part of the 
movement toward a more just and humane world, those responsible for 
aggression must learn that they will no longer be immune, but will be held 
accountable by an International Criminal Court acting in the name of all 
peace-loving nations. 
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